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CHAPTER TEN 
FISCAL REGULATION 
Changes in the American constitutional system are as clearly 
registered in the relationship of church and state as in any other area. 
Conflicts arising out of the changing legal status and moral condition 
of the church within the larger community are especially evident with 
respect to three issues: property, education, and church autonomy. A 
Fundamentalist attorney, David Gibbs, has summarized the issues as 
follows: who owns the church, who owns the children, and who owns the 
1 land? The very starkness of these questions directs attention 
immediately to the basic perceptions about jurisdiction that help shape 
the public agenda of the nation. Regardless of the cordiality or 
animosity that may color personal relations between church and state 
officials, the terms of discourse are set by underlying religious and 
political beliefs about authority. 
The first question--who owns the church?--goes directly to the 
heart of the age-old conflict. On the surface, it is simply a question 
of title: who owns the buildings, the pews, the endowments, or the real 
estate? But more importantly, it is a constitutional question about 
sovereignty that has serious legal and practical implications for the 
church. Changes in fiscal policies may do more to redefine the status 
and role of the church in American society than all the regulatory 
innovations in other policy areas combined. Much of the current 
controversy centers on the stipulations attached to some church tax 
exemptions. 
2 Taxation, in fact, has a long history of regulatory uses. For 
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example, some taxes are regarded as a means of promoting public health, 
safety, welfare, morals, or peace. High taxes on products considered to 
be socially useless or harmful indulgences, such as tobacco and liquor, 
are often justified as disincentives designed to suppress their demand. 
In this respect, regulatory taxes have taken the place of the sumptuary 
laws of earlier generations. But far from remedying perceived moral or 
social problems, their double function may be self-defeating. Such 
taxes give the state an economic interest in the products it regulates 
and, at the same time, shift the tax burden to those who can least 
afford it. To the extent they succeed as revenue measures, they may 
fail as regulatory devices. 
Subsidies also provide an effective "conduit for regulation." 3 For 
example, the strings attached to federal grants-in-aid are used to 
promote national policy by encouraging state and local governments to 
adopt a variety of new laws, procedures, programs, and other 
. t• 4 lnnova lons. Similarly, if tax exemptions are defined as privileges 
rather than immunities, they are equally susceptible to such regulatory 
uses. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are inherent dangers 
in the power to tax. In affirming the principle of intergovernmental 
tax immunity, Chief Justice John Marshall commented in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819) that "the power to tax involves the 
power to destroy." 5 If the power to create involves the power to 
preserve, the agencies of a sovereign government may not lawfully be 
taxed by another. 
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The behavior of churches, like that of individuals, may be 
effectively and predictably governed by manipulating their purse strings 
through taxes and subsidies. But there is historical evidence to 
suggest that the principle of tax immunity originally applied to 
American churches, as well. Even though there was no statute expressly 
providing for the exemption of church property in the District of 
Columbia until 1871, church property was never assessed for taxes. 6 
Church property enjoyed similar immunity from state taxes. In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has held in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 
664, 677 (1970), that tax exemptions are a legitimate way to prevent an 
"excessive entanglement" between church and state. 
What complicates the picture today is the use of taxation as a 
means of regulating social, political, and economic behavior. Tax 
exemptions are widely regarded as subsidies rather than immunities. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently adopted this view in Regan v. 
Taxation With Representation, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2000 (1983), although its 
ramifications are only beginning to be spelled out. Income taxation has 
grown into a sophisticated actuarial science by which a wide range of 
policy goals may be pursued through various "tax incentives." 
In this connection, and perhaps due to the perennial quest for new 
sources of revenue, the tax exemptions enjoyed by religious groups have 
been narrowed by complex and abstruse ecclesiastical distinctions 
prescribed by administrative agencies and further complicated by endless 
debate and litigation. But the basic problem is the old one of 
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reconciling a variety of religious traditions and the legal requirements 
of a state that lacks an official church. According to Charles Whelan, 
the "civil law structure of American churches rarely corresponds closely 
with their internal ecclesiastical organization .... In order to 
establish an identity in American civil law, most of these 
ecclesiastical entities have created one or more civil law corporations 
or trusts." 7 For example, there is no civil law counterpart to the 
ecclesiastical unity of hierarchical churches, like the Roman Catholic 
Church, or even that of congregational churches which maintain 
separately incorporated ministries. But apart from these difficulties, 
the very act of classifying religious bodies for tax purposes has 
created some serious anomalies that have extended into other legal 
areas, such as land use, the licensure of particular ministries, and 
corporate rights. 
Both income and property taxation create a potentially entangling 
relationship between church and state when tax exemption is treated as a 
privilege rather than as an immunity. In recent years a multitude of 
stipulations--such as filing requirements for some religious 
organizations and restrictions on lobbying and political activities 
--have been attached to exemptions that may be every bit as inhibitory 
in effect as the strings attached to outright grants. Since tax 
agencies today exercise legislative as well as executive power in the 
area of administrative law, their formidable regulatory reach can easily 
short-circuit the sort of restraints on official power that sustain a 
republican form of government. First Amendment privileges and 
immunities are consequently at stake. Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus 
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see a threat to church independence: 
The danger today is not that churches or any one church will take 
over the state. The much more real danger is that the state will 
take over the functions of the church, except for the most narrowly 
construed de~inition of religion limited to worship and religious 
instruction. 
Background 
The concept of "a free church in a free state" has long been 
translated in America to mean that religion is essentially private and 
voluntary. As a reaction against the inequities that plagued the 
earlier religious establishments, this attitude is understandable. But 
it has also made interpretation of the historical record more difficult 
and has left the boundaries between church and state in dispute. The 
dichotomization of religion into belief and practice is a logical 
extension of the American voluntary church tradition. Glenn T. Miller 
has remarked: 
The philosophy on which the Republic was based interpreted religion 
primarily in terms of conscience. Whatever value such an 
identification may have had in theory, it ignores the fact that 
religion throughout its history has been more than conscience. 
Religious faith almost always involves some participation ~n a 
religious community that supports and sustains that faith. 
The comparative neglect of this side of religious life in American 
political thought after the War for Independence is important to an 
understanding of the peculiar status of the church in American law. As 
Miller has noted, the legal system reflected and reinforced the dominant 
congregationalism that influenced even the hierarchical traditions by 
the time. This influence may be seen in the incorporation laws that 
were gradually adopted as a means of legitimizing church property and 
which further contributed to the dichotomization: 
435 
The local churches simply added the trustees to their list of 
officers and restricted their powers to secular matters. The 
religious questions before the congregation remained in the hands 
of the appropriate body, whether the deacons, the etsers, or the 
vestry. In the main, this arrangement worked well. 
Miller also noted a tendency for the laws to favor doctrinal 
modernization. Courts have tended to shy away from doctrinal questions 
in the event of a church split and a dispute over disposition of the 
t t h t t . . l d 11 proper y excep w ere an express rus lS lnvo ve . Before the 
decision in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1871 ), in which the Court 
deferred to the decision of the highest authority in the church polity, 
the courts had generally favored the majority faction of the 
congregation. This still held true where the church was congregational 
in form. In Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131 (1872), a church 
property case involving two factions of a Baptist church, the Court 
held: "In a congregational church, the majority, if they adhere to the 
organization and to the doctrines, represent the church" (15 Wall. 131, 
140). More recently, the Court's decision in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
595 (1979), has demonstrated a new willingness to recognize the majority 
of a local church, just as long as control is not clearly vested in a 
hierarchy and only purely secular evidence is considered. The concept 
of an implied trust can not be extended to include questions of 
faithfulness to doctrine. 
Carl Zollmann, the foremost early interpreter of church property 
law, treated the privatization of religion as a positive development. 
He accepted the maxim that "Christianity is part of the law of the land" 
but did not acknowledge the dependence of American political and legal 
institutions on Christianity. Zollmann maintained that since religious 
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belief is "entirely relegated to the domain of the individual 
conscience" it is legally irrelevant, so that when, for example, "the 
guardianship of children comes in question the question of the religion 
of the proposed guardian will not be considered." 12 
The private status of religion in American law is also quite evident 
in lavJs affecting the incorporation of churches. But the nature of 
corporations has changed considerably since the time of Constantine. 
After the Roman Catholic Church was allowed to accept legacies in the 
time of Constantine, according to Paul Kauper and Stephen Ellis, it 
"recognized the usefulness of corporate status and soon adopted the idea 
into the canon law." Voluntary associations with the power to hold land 
could be formed without prior consent or approval by the state. But the 
situation changed under English common law when powerful monarchs 
asserted that "organizations exercising collegiate or corporate powers 
could exist only with the prior approval of the monarch." 
The requirement of prior approval by the state stressed the 
supremacy of the state over the church, a notion that was at 
variance with the church's view of itself and with traditional 
medieval notions of church-state relations. The Catholic Church 
saw itself as a moral person, founded in divine law, with the power 
to administer its own property independently of any sovereign. 
However, the Reformation, at least in England, destroyed any notion 
that the church existed as a separate spiritual entity immune from 
rule by the civil authorities. The use of the corporate form was 
limited to organizations upon which the privilege had been 
expressly bestowed. The church could no longer reside in England 
as a recognized entity with the power to take and hold property. 
It was now reduced to the level of any other voluntary, 
uninco1§orated association, dependent upon the state's grant of 
power. 
The earliest religious corporations during the colonial period were 
public municipal corporations. 14 As such, these church establishments 
were instruments of the state and often exercised police and taxation 
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powers. Some dissenting churches were eventually granted similar 
charters and became recipients of state revenue. Finally, even church 
societies that were unable to obtain corporate charters won recognition 
as private corporations: 
Under such circumstances the common law doctrine of prescription 
was applied. A presumption was raised, from the long exercise of 
corporate powers, that a charter had been granted but had been 
lost. Under the theory of this fictitious lost charter the society 
was.reco~gized as capable of making contracts and taking 
devlces. 
But changing legal circumstances made prescription too unreliable, so 
that--usually following a challenge in court--the state legislatures 
were compelled to formalize the legal privileges and immunities of 
churches. General incorporation acts and constitutional or statutory 
tax exemptions were the common responses by the middle of the nineteenth 
16 
century. Religious corporations typically took one of three forms: 
the trustee corporation, the membership corporation, and the corporation 
sole. The latter was favored by the Roman Catholic Church. 
In regard to the tax exemption of churches, the record of colonial 
and early state practice still awaits a thorough study but a few 
conclusions are generally accepted. It has been the common practice of 
the states to exempt churches from a variety of taxes since earliest 
times. But opinions were not uniformly favorable even at the beginning. 
D. B. Robertson notes that James Madison was critical of a proposed 
exemption for churches in Kentucky and later, as President, vetoed bills 
to incorporate the Protestant Episcopal Church in Alexandria and reserve 
a parcel of land in the Mississippi Territory for a Baptist church: 17 
If Madison's opposition to the incorporation of churches appears to 
be extreme in terms of its possible establishment of a church, it 
must be understood in the context of interpretations of 
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incorporation in his time. First, corporate power in the colonial 
period was rarely given even to business institutions. Then, a 
corporation was the state's creature, and into it the state 
"breathed fictitious life." Note that a part of Madison's Veto 
Message dealt with the danger of the state's entry into the inner 
life of the church. Third, in the colonial establishments, the 
state church, with its corporate status, had special privileges 
denied to other religious societies. Fourth, corporate powers in 
the colonial period had often included the power to tax; one has to 
remember the explosive import of taxation in the pre-Revolutionary 
colonies. Finally, it was a cause for susplclon that churches with 
the capacity to hold property in their own right could, as an 
"endowed church," become too powerful. These factors must be taken 
into account in association with another point. We deliberately 
avoided the creation in this country of ecclesiastical corporations 
such as existed in England. Many states included constitutional 
provisions that all organizations, when incorporated, be 18 incorporated under a general law covering all groups alike. 
This "danger of the state's entry into the inner life of the 
church" should not be minimized. Under common law, a corporation is a 
creature of the state, a secular entity. In the words of Carl Zollmann, 
"it is not a spiritual entity with spiritual powers to preach the gospel 
and administer the sacraments, but a humble secular handmaid whose 
functions are confined to the creation and enforcement of contracts and 
the acquisition, management and disposition of property." 19 This is 
only too easily forgotten. The incorporation of a religious society 
places the title to church property into the hands of the trustees and 
subjects the corporate body to all the obligations of a secular 
association, including taxation in the form of a filing fee. The 
intricate web of finance and regulation now entangling the church gives 
substance to Madison's doubts. 
If these early experiments in religious liberty showed signs of 
uncertainty and ambivalence, this may be readily explained by the 
freshness of the sectarian animosities that had been generated by and 
eventually brought down the religious establishments. Even so, churches 
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continued to be well protected under common law and were regarded as 
centers of community life. In the Terrett decision and similar cases 
which followed, such as Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New 
Haven, 8 Wheat. 464 (1823), and Mason v. Muncaster, 9 Wheat. 445 (1824), 
the Supreme Court upheld the property succession rights of formerly 
established churches. 
Private property in general was constitutionally protected against 
unwarranted searches and seizures, thus enjoying a sanctity once 
reserved to recognized churches. Public taxation and expenditure were 
expected to spread the costs and benefits of public services equitably 
and not be used for private gain. 20 Police powers--including the 
regulation of property with respect to fire prevention, public highways, 
sanitation, and zoning--were held to be delegated by the local citizenry 
to their town and county officers, reflecting a tradition of local 
f 1 . 21 sel -government that reached back to feuda tlmes. Yet churches were 
not only exempted from taxes but were also recipients of a variety of 
social benefits without being subjected to obtrusive social regulation. 
Although their immunities may have been largely customary, it is 
unlikely that the early legislatures ever foresaw a day when police 
regulations might be used to exclude churches from some neighborhoods in 
advance, be kept from improving their facilities by restrictive zoning 
laws, or even be forbidden to hold prayer meetings in private homes 
without a permit. 22 This growing emphasis on external regulation--as 
opposed to internalized moral control--supports the thesis that American 
society has been in the midst of a transition between an inner-directed 
culture to an other-directed one. 23 But this change is by no means 
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completely assured. 
Early American law made a distinction bet~;veen the church itself and 
the religious society that held church property in trust. Zollmann 
explored the legal implications of this distinction: 
An unincorporated church, so-called, if it has any interest in 
property at all, presents a two-fold aspect. It has a body, that 
society, with which courts can deal, and a soul, the church, with 
which courts cannot deal .... The church is subject to spiritual 
censure, the society is subject to the temporal powers that be. 
The object of the church is the preaching of ~lle gospel, the object 
of the society is the management of property. 
He thus removed the problem of temporal control over the church by 
defining atvay its possibility. But this makes the church virtually 
nonexistent as far as the law is concerned. Such a definition is 
susceptible to the charge--often lodged against excessive piety--that 
"it is so heavenly minded it is no earthly good." Zollmann apparently 
failed to recognize the importance of upholding tax exemptions as an 
immunity from interference with religious free exercise rather than 
simply as an admirable custom: 
This exemption is not so easily justified on principle as it is 
supported by authority. It is in fact easier to admire the motive 
which prompted it than to justify it by any sound reasoning. While 
charity and education may be said to be established in the policy 
of the state, an establishment of religion is expressly prohibited 
both in the federal constitution and in most if not all the state 
constitutions. The strictly religious features of church societies 
can therefore furnish no valid reason for this exemption. The only 
rational ground remaining on which it can be justified is the 
benefit accruing to the state thro~§h the influence exerted by 
various churches on their members. 
The view of Carl Zollmann that church tax exemptions were awarded 
as a mere afterthought, and that they are justifiable only on the basis 
of some presumed public benefit, has been an influential one. Lee 
Pfeffer articulated it from a separationist rationale: 
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Objective consideration of the oplnlons in the Everson and McCollum 
cases leads to the conclusion that tax exemption for churches 
violates the First Amendment as interpreted by these 
decisions .... Under these decisions, government aid to religion, 
even if not preferential or discriminatory, is barred by the 
Constitution, and few would2geny that exemption of church property 
constitutes government aid. 
Robert Drinan similarly reiterated this position from an 
accomrnodationist perspective: 
No entirely satisfactory rationale for tax exemption has ever been 
stated in any American judicial decision. It may be that the only 
possible ultimate justification is a public policy consciously 
encouraging religion as a valuable aid to good citizenship. Courts 
and commentators quite understandably are reluctant to reach such 
ultimates and, if they must give a plausible reason for tax 
immunity for religious bodies, tend to urge one of the three 
following justifications: 
1. Tax exemption for churches and related institutions has 
always existed in American law; in fact, it can be traced back to 
Constantine or even to the Talmud, according to which rabbis wsre 
given certain tax exemptions. 
2. Churches by means of the educational programs which they 
sponsor participate in the work of the state and thereby relieve it 
of some of its burdens. 
3. No Court decision in American jurisprudence has ever ruled 
that tax exem~fion to religious groups is a discrimination against 
nonbelievers. 
There is no historical evidence to conclude that the tax immunity 
of churches was regarded as a subsidy. Any exemption, credit, or 
deduction could be viewed in the same manner. While the benefits of tax 
immunity are quite evident, the public and governmental nature of the 
church should not be overlooked. This lies at the heart of the matter. 
Zollmann argued that churches were originally exempted because they were 
28 public agencies and were the public property. This is true only in a 
very qualified sense because they were neither the property of the 
parish nor the property of the state. Prior to the Dedham case, only 
covenanted church members participated in determining church policy in 
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Massachusetts. 
While the character of churches as taxing authorities helps account 
for their traditional exemption, a different explanation must account 
for the continuation of the exemption after disestablishment. But, in 
fact, the practice of exempting churches was not so unconscious as the 
belated statutory recognition of it might seem to indicate. The wording 
of a New York statute of 1801 suggests that churches, which had been 
disestablished in 1777, were still regarded as public rather than 
private entities. The statute provided: 
That no houses or lands belonging to the United States or to the 
people of this state, nor any church or place of public worship, 
nor any personal property belonging to any minister or priest not 
exceeding in value of one thousand five hundred dollars, nor any 
college or incorporated academy, nor any schoolhouse, courthouse, 
goal [sic], alms house, or property belonging to 2~Y incorporated 
library, shall be taxed by any law of this state. 
A similar understanding of the public nature of church ministries may be 
found in City of Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634 (1852), which upheld tax 
immunity: 
It is presumed that in the nineteenth century, in a Christian land, 
no argument is necessary to show that church purposes are public 
purposes .... To deny that church purposes are public purposes is 
to argue that the maintenance, support, and propagation of the 
Christian religion is not a matter of public concern. Our laws, 
although they recognize no particular religious establishment, are 
not insensible to the advantages of Christianity, and extend their 
protection to all in that faith and mode of worship they may choose 
to adopt. 
If the tax exemption of churches is to be regarded as a relic of 
the era of state religion, it would appear to be an expensive and often 
inconvenient relic. But the church was not under the patronage of the 
sovereign, as in England, where it was one of the estates of the realm. 
The encouragement of religion was not equated with an establishment of 
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religion in the narrow sense of an established church. The kind of 
separation of church and state the founders sought would not have 
permitted this. 
The exemption of churches from taxes only became a salient 
political issue long after independence, particularly during two periods 
of social and economic upheaval in the nineteenth century. The first 
period coincided with the era of Jacksonian Democracy, the Workingmen's 
Party in New York, and the early reform movement fostered by various 
benevolent societies. It was also a time of nativist agitation, 
t . M d th d . t' f 11 f f · '1 30 an l- asonry, an e enuncla lOn o a orms o prlVl ege. D. B. 
Robertson quoted one expression of this sentiment: 
One obvious form of privilege to be destroyed as "the exemption 
from taxation of churches, church property, and the property of 
priests under fifteen hundred dollars, for it3yas nothing short of 
a direct and positive robbery of the people." 
The second period coincided with the Civil War and Reconstruction, the 
sundering of three major denominations, and the controversy over a 
proposed Christian Amendment and, later, the Blaine Amendment. Churches 
divided over the Grant Administration's appeal for the establishment of 
a national public school system coupled with the taxation of church 
property. Since support tended to be mild and opposition was intense, 
the proposed amendment failed. 32 Although lobbying against the tax 
immunity of churches flared from time to time afterwards, one 
commentator concluded by 1949 that "the tax-exemption battle of the 
churches seems to have been won by exhaustion." 33 
Dean Kelley's characterization of this immunity as "a condition 
almost of 'extraterritoriality'"34 is a singularly appropriate one, both 
in light of historical courtesy and with reference to the vulnerability 
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of foreign enclaves and diplomatic missions. Like the rest of society, 
churches have been similarly affected by changing legal, economic, and 
political conditions at home and abroad. 
But the traditional accommodation may be most threatened by a shift 
in the major policymaking arena from the legislatures to the courts and 
now to the administrative agencies: which is to say, from fairly visible 
to very invisible organs of civil government. Numerous pieces of social 
legislation--often worded in general terms--have spawned a variety of 
sometimes competing administrative programs and bureaus that seek to 
define, often as broadly as possible, the scope of their delegated 
authority. With reference to the role played by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) in applying charitable benefit criteria in determining tax 
exemptions, Justice Powell argued in Bob Jones University v. United 
States, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2039 (1983): "It is not appropriate to leave the 
IRS 'on the cutting edge of developing national policy' .... The 
contours of public policy should be determined by Congress, not by 
judges or the IRS." Indeed, compared with the incremental revision of 
traditional accommodations amidst the tangle of administrative law 
created by federal agencies, the limited lobbying and legal successes of 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, New York's 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and other separationist organizations seem fairly 
pallict. 35 Ironically, Americans United lost its status as a tax-exempt 
educational organization in Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 
U.S. 752 (1974), as a result of its own extensive lobbying on religious 
issues. 
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Income Taxation 
Edwin R. A. Seligman, an early American proponent of progressive 
income taxation, maintained that the income tax per se evolved only 
gradually out of earlier faculty taxes: poll taxes, property taxes, and 
consumption taxes. By the 1840s, it had been introduced in a fairly 
mature form in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and other states. 36 
Although the income tax was suggested as a source of federal revenue 
following the War of 1812, it was not adopted until 1862 by the Union 
and 1863 by the Confederacy as a war measure. The Socialist and 
Populist parties promoted the idea through their platforms but the 
income tax lapsed following the war. It was revived by Congress in 1894 
but the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional a year later. 37 Passage 
of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 enabled Congress to add income tax 
provisions to a tariff act later that year. 38 
At first, the personal income tax was not a major source of federal 
revenue and served instead more as a supplement to tariffs and excises. 
Even in 1938, as Henry G. Simon noted, it contributed less than ten 
39 percent of all revenues. Today, personal income taxes represent 
nearly half of net federal receipts. 
The utility of the income tax as a source of revenue is perhaps 
exceeded only by its potential as a means of information-gathering and 
regulation. Although exemptions were recognized from the beginning, a 
lobbying limitation on exempt organizations was added in 1934, followed 
twenty years later by provisions against influencing legislation or 
"intervening" in political campaigns. In the meantime, the Treasury 
Department itself introduced a regulation denying deductibility to 
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contributions to "associations formed to disseminate controversial or 
partisan propaganda." 40 This helped establish a pattern of bureaucratic 
initiative, followed later by congressional authorization or judicial 
permission after the fact. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been given a series of 
congressional authorizations since 1939 to establish an elaborate 
monitoring system for tax-exempt organizations. Sharon Worthing has 
described the system as follows: "The system has five basic components: 
the information return, the notice requirements for entitlement to 
treatment as an exempt organization, the Exempt Organization Master 
File, various types of IRS audits, and IRS cooperation with state 
41 
attorneys general." She believes that an inordinate amount of 
attention is directed at a "particular category of organizations which 
includes churches and their officers" and observes that while "there is 
a reasonable limit on information obtained for the purpose of collecting 
taxes ... there is no limit on the information which may be sought 
when the motive is one of surveillance only." 42 She believes that, due 
to "the ease with which tax laws can be used to control an 
organization's functions even without loss of exempt status," the 
requirement that some church-related organizations file information 
returns "can be seen as a first step whose ultimate end is full 
government surveillance of religious institutions.n 43 
Even though churches are included within the mandatory exceptions 
from the filing requirement, church-related ministries are less secure 
unless they are readily identifiable as "integrated auxiliaries." This 
term had been interpreted by IRS to mean church-affiliated organizations 
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whose "principal activity is exclusively religious.'' Despite the 
vagueness of the original congressional wording, IRS has determined 
''integrated auxiliaries'' to include seminaries, youth groups, and adult 
fellowships, but to exclude hospitals, homes for the elderly, 
44 
orphanages, and grade schools. 
But apart from difficulties created by differing conceptions of 
what activities are properly called church ministries, even bona fide 
churches are having their exemptions challenged by IRS. Pastor Dale 
Dykema of the Church of Christian Liberty in Brookfield, Wisconsin, has 
been ordered by a federal circuit court to turn over fourteen categories 
of church records subpoenaed so that IRS could make a determination on 
its tax-exempt status. The church, which follows the Westminster 
Confession, has not been accused of violating the law or operating an 
unrelated business. To date, it has refused to comply with the order. 45 
This is not an isolated case. A Mennonite church has been denied tax 
exemption because it maintains a medical aid plan for its members. 
46 Other churches have been sent demands for church records. 
The rationale for church tax exemptions is also a matter of dispute 
in the current literature. Two major theories of income tax exemption 
have been competing for support in recent years. The first of these, 
known as the tax expenditure theory, treats tax exemption as "an 
affirmative benefit extended by legislative grace to those organizations 
that benefit the public (and withdrawable at will from those the 
legislature deems no longer deserving of its favor)." 47 From this 
viewpoint, exemptions are regarded as "revenues foregone by the 
government as though granted to the exempt entity in fulfillment of 
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legislative purposes ... 
When viewed in this light, church exemptions would fail the secular 
purpose and neutral effect portions of the tripartite test. As for the 
entanglement test, the tax expenditure theory might even tip the scales 
against exempting churches because from the viewpoint of political 
expediency, if for no other reason, it would be difficult to reject a 
strict accounting from the recipients. The Chief Justice indicated as 
much in the Lemon case. All such information would be necessarily a 
matter of public record, greatly increasing the risks of political and 
economic coercion--either by the state or by private groups--against 
churches. 
Rules against political activity, lobbying, unrelated business 
income, and various types of religion-based discrimination may have a 
similar chilling effect. Churches are not more inclined than anyone 
else to bite the hand that feeds them. The monitoring of religious 
organizations by IRS even now tends to produce "the kind of continuing 
day-to-day relationship" which the Court tried to obviate in its Walz 
decision. Although Chief Justice Warren Burger rejected the "social 
welfare yardstick" as a rationale for church exemptions because of its 
quid pro quo implications, he weakened his overall case for exemptions 
by arguing that they necessarily involved some degree of entanglement. 
The other current theory of tax exemption is known as the tax base 
theory. Its statement by Boris Bittker is considered definitive: 
A close examination of the nature of tax exemptions reveals a 
serious weakness in the contention that exemptions automatically 
serve to establish religion. There is no way to tax everything; a 
legislative body, no matter how avid for revenue, can do no more 
than pick out from the universe of people, entities, and events 
over which it has jurisdiction those that, in its view, are 
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appropriate objects of taxation. In specifying the ambit of any 
tax, the legislature cannot avoid "exempting" those persons, 
events, activitie~~ or entities that are outside the territory of 
the proposed tax. 
Bittker's argument from technical impracticality weakens his case. 
Recent advances in communications technology suggest that the taxable 
"universe" may be expanded or restructured indefinitely. The tax base 
theory also fails to address the issue of whether it is within the 
jurisdiction of the state to tax the church. Bittker appears to assume 
that legislative bodies possess inherent power to seek revenue from any 
available source. This might include churches. 
The tax base theory treats churches in the same way as nonprofit 
organizations in general. This can create difficulties if authorities 
try to draw the logical conclusion that churches are also public trusts. 
Establishment clause issues would be unavoidable. The defensibility of 
tax exemptions for churches must rest on some other basis. 
Separationists argue that such exemptions effectively give churches 
favored status and, in addition, give public officials some leverage 
over the conduct of church affairs. If exemptions are indeed treated as 
subsidies, it is difficult to escape the conclusion reached by Justice 
Jackson about the effects of such aid in his Everson dissent: 
If the state may aid these religious schools, it may therefore 
regulate them. Many groups have sought aid from tax funds only to 
find that it carried political controls with it. Indeed this Court 
has declared that 'It is hardly lack of due process for the 
Governm~mt to regulate that Hhich it subsidizes' ( 330 U.S. 1 , 
27-28). 
Given the state's technical ability to oversee and regulate church 
activities, further constitutional precautions against such an 
eventuality would need to be taken, particularly if the taxation of 
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churches were favored under a new interpretation of the establishment 
clause favored the taxation of churches. As a practical matter, the tax 
exemption of churches could be sustained under the tax expenditure 
theory only if churches as churches are regarded as immune from the 
jurisdiction of the state in this respect. But the issue is larger than 
a tax immunity. If the state were to assert jurisdiction over every 
activity that takes place within its territorial boundaries, it would 
effectively claim whatever authority the church possesses as its own. 
If the state were to limit its direct interest in certain activities, 
such as the exercise of religion, simply as a matter of expediency, then 
what seems inexpedient at one point may become expedient under different 
circumstances. Only by recognizing that the jurisdiction of the state 
is inherently limited and that churches are protected from interference 
can the inevitable involvement of the church with the state and the 
state with the church be addressed in a manner that respects the 
authority of the church as a self-governing entity. 
Adequate constitutional protections already exist. But 
constitutional practice tends to follow suit when constitutional theory 
changes. Th~s far, the operations of comparatively few churches have 
been called into question for failure to comply with rules established 
for tax-exempt organizations. In the absence of income tax filing 
requirements for churches, most churches have had little or no direct 
contact with IRS until recently. 
But as a result of recent changes in the Social Security Act, which 
took effect on January 1, 1984, churches are now required to pay 
withholding taxes for nonministerial staff employees. It is widely 
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believed to be the first instance of a direct tax being imposed on 
churches. Ordained ministers are still able to apply for and receive 
self-employment exemptions. 
Particular concern has been expressed that this precedent may have 
a snowball effect if it is allowed to stand. Many Fundamentalist 
churches--perhaps numbering a few thousand--have already refused to file 
the required tax forms. At the same time, many of these churches have 
dissolved their corporations in order to free themselves from an 
entangling relationship with the state and possibly escape liability for 
51 the tax. 
Court challenges can be anticipated if an attempt to amend or delay 
the law fails in Congress. But a ruling favorable to the churches may 
be considered unlikely in view of the Court's decision in United States 
v. Lee, 102 S.Ct. 1051 (1982), unanimously reversing a lower court 
ruling that an Amish employer is exempted from having to pay social 
security taxes for his Amish employees. The Court narrowly construed a 
statutory exemption accommodating self-employed Amish and self-employed 
members of other religious groups who objected to the taxes. Chief 
Justice Burger wrote that "mandatory participation is indispensable to 
the fiscal vitality of the social security system. Most revealing of 
all, however, was his treatment of religious exemptions: 
The difficulty in attempting to accommodate religious beliefs in 
the area of taxation is that 'we are a cosmopolitan nation made up 
of people of almost every conceivable religious preference.' 
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606, 81 S.Ct. at 1147. The Court has long 
recognized that balance must be struck between the values of the 
comprehensive social system, which rests on a co~plex of actuarial 
factors, and the consequences of allowing religiously based 
exemptions. To maintain an organized society that guarantees 
religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some 
religious practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs 
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can be accommodated . . . but there is a point at which 
accommodation would "radically restrict the operating latitude of 
the legislature." Braunfeld, supra at 606, 81 S.Ct. at 1147. 
Unlike the situation presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder, ... it 
would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security 
system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of 
religious beliefs. The obligation to pay the social security tax 
initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay 
income taxes; the difference--in theory at least--is that the 
social security tax revenues are segregated for use only in 
furtherance of the statutory program. There is no principled way, 
howEver, for purposes of this case, to distinguish between general 
taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act. If, for 
example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a 
certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as 
devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a 
similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of 
the income tax. The tax system could not function if denominations 
were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were 
spent in a manner that violates their religious belief (102 S.Ct. 
1051' 1056). 
By implication, the Court here treats tax exemption on religious 
grounds as an act of grace by the sovereign, as many lower courts have 
done in the past. The decision also makes evident some of the 
disadvantages for churches of the broadened definition of religion. The 
accommodation of religious belief, as exemplified by the Sherbert, 
Yoder, and Thomas rulings, is now described in purely discretionary 
terms. It is no longer simply a matter of restricting religious conduct 
which diverges from commonly accepted moral standards. Religious 
liberty is now effectively limited by considerations about the 
consequences of generally available exceptions. Its independent 
constitutional value is also reduced, which has a tendency to narrow the 
boundaries of religious liberty. The competing claims of a wide variety 
of religious beliefs may consequently make the recognition of 
religion-based exceptions more difficult to justify or sustain. 
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Property Taxation 
Although the intricacies of the income tax system may pose the 
greatest potential hazard for fiscal entanglements between church and 
state, this potential is likely to remain latent as long as churches 
enjoy generally favorable public opinion. The fiscal crises of major 
American cities, which wax and wane with greater intensity than ever, 
may pose a greater immediate challenge as local governments seek new 
sources of revenue. One idea that is already gaining strong support is 
the restriction of property tax exemptions to the sanctuary of the 
church, the classroom building of the school, and the land immediately 
52 beneath. Assuming such a plan to be practicable and equitable, it 
leaves unanswered an important question: What happens when new sources 
of revenue are required? 
Church property tax exemptions, which are well established in 
historical precedent, are similarly regarded as subsidies by many 
critics. According to Arvo Van Alstyne: "One of the most pervasive and 
firmly stablished anomalies in American law is the permissibility of 
subsidization of religious institutions through tax exemption in a legal 
order constitutionally committed to separation of church and state."53 
This assumes that the practice is not only inconsistent with general tax 
policy, as it well may be, but that it also violates the constitutional 
commitment to separation of church and state. The last point is 
debatable. But Van Alstyne recognized the inherent problem with a 
vaguely worded exemption, which, as he noted, "constitutes a veritable 
invitation to aggressive and conscientious tax officers to resolve any 
doubts against exemptions." 
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Vagueness of exemption language, coupled with the institutional 
dynamics of the assessor's position, tends, by inviting litigation, 
to impose a practical tax discrimination upon those churches which 
are most in need of financial assistance and least able5to afford the costs, financial and otherwise, of such litigation. 
This observation holds just as true today as it did when it was written 
in the 1950s. It is part of the danger of the entanglement problem that 
its effects are generally hidden from public view. 
But the hazards of overzealous law enforcement are only part of the 
story. Legislative vagueness invites creative interpretations by the 
revenue agencies themselves. An atmosphere of general uncertainty tends 
to dampen enthusiasm and innovation. Van Alstyne attributed a 
"particularly vicious impact'' to what he calls legislative buck-passing, 
then added: 
Another feature of the church exemption pattern, with respect to 
which little has been said, relates to the influence which tax 
exemptions may exert in motivating or perhaps even controlling 
decisions of church policy. The array of special conditions which 
statutes frequently impose upon the availability of exemption may 
impose realistic barriers to freedom of action. For example, 
statutory emphasis upon "use'' for exempt purposes, although perhaps 
without any conscious legislative intent to reach that result, has 
frequently resulted in denial of exemption to church buildings 
under construction. Paradoxically, such denial normally occurs at 
the very time when the fundamentaS 5considerations justifying tax exemption are at their strongest. 
As long as tax exemptions are considered subsidies, they are 
difficult to square with current separationist doctrine. Financial need 
and social utility are unlikely to be accepted as arguments in favor of 
continuing them. The major difficulty with the tax expenditure theory 
from the standpoint of churches is the possibility that conditions would 
be attached to tax exemptions. 
These problems may be inherent in the nature of the general 
property tax and, particularly, in the dependence of local taxing 
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districts on property taxes as a source of revenue. The dwindling urban 
tax base--coupled with the deterioration of its existing capital, the 
growing expense of maintenance, the geographical containment of its 
taxing authority, and the anachronization of its economic 
infrastructure--is both the cause and the effect of the flight to the 
suburbs, urban sprawl, and general social dislocation. 56 Property 
taxes, particularly as they are normally assessed, tend to work against 
improvements. Zoning regulations are sought to help protect property 
values, but the segregation of property according to use and population 
characteristics may have the effect of further aggravating these 
conditions. 57 In this light, the church may be seen as one of many 
drains on the tax base, one of many anomalies in land use plans, and one 
of many possible supplicants for relief. 
Cases and Controversies 
The entanglement problems associated with property taxes and the 
use of church property generally arise in conjunction with other 
regulations relating to schools, zoning, income taxes, or corporate 
privileges. Trouble in one area may spell trouble in others. Internal 
church disputes, neighborhood complaints, political controversies, and 
law enforement policies are among the usual catalysts. 
A property tax dispute that involved over sixty churches in 
California is illustrative of the interrelatedness of the factors that 
may create entanglement problems. Before the controversy was resolved 
through special legislation signed by the governor on June 22, 1983, 
several churches had lost all corporate privileges, including use of 
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their name and their right to representation in court. At least 
thirty-five churches of these churches faced public auction for back 
taxes. 
The dispute originated over several related issues. Attorney 
General George Deukmejian, who became the Governor of California in 
1983, issued an opinion in 1979 that made the following points. First, 
he maintained that churches and their schools may be classified 
separately. For tax purposes, churches were then being required to file 
annual "Church Exemption" forms. This exemption was applicable only to 
property "used exclusively for religious worship." Schools were 
required to file "Welfare Exemption" forms. Second, he concluded that 
churches are liable for the payment of taxes just as long as a 
particular tax or fee is not exacted for the privilege of exercising 
their religion. Third, he characterized the tax exmption of churches as 
''a bounty or gratuity on the part of the sovereign and when once granted 
may be withdrawn." Finally, he held that churches are charitable public 
trusts. By definition, this means that churches hold property in trust 
for the state. 58 
The immediate catalyst of the dispute was the insertion of a clause 
in the Franchise Tax Board's Form 199B for 1978. It simply read: 
a. If exempt under Section 23701D and you have during the year 
(1) attempted to influence legislation or any ballot measure, 
or (2) participated in any political campaign, or (3) made an 
election under Section 23704.5 (relating to lobbying by public 
charities), complete and attach Form FTB 3509 (available from59 your local Franchise Tax Board Office). (See Instruction f.) 
Below this new section was a note concerning failure to file: "The 
corporate rights, powers and privileges may be suspended, or the 
exemption from tax may be revoked for failure to file an information 
statement." Instruction f defined "influencing legislation" as 
including advocating "the adoption or rejection of legislation." 
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These instructions posed a dilemma for many pastors who had made 
statements from the pulpit on sensitive political issues. Rev. Roy 
Morawski of Fundamental Baptist Church in Santa Maria even sent an 
inquiry to the Franchise Tax Board early in 1980 stating that 
periodically he spoke against abortion and homosexuality from the pulpit 
and had recently encouraged church members to vote against a statewide 
initiative concerning homosexual rights. A tax auditor replied: "The 
political activity disclosed in your letter of February 5, 1980, is 
considered influencing legislation and you will be required to file form 
FTB 3509 with this office." 6° Filing the form meant that the church 
would be assessed for taxes. Failure to file meant the loss of 
corporate privileges for incorporated churches. Filing Form 199B 
without acknowledging political activities would have had the same 
result. 
Several churches chose not to file and formed an organization to 
work toward changing these rules. In fact, the 1980 Form 199B ~rapped 
the stipulation relating to influencing legislation but added a note to 
an otherwise inapplicable section of the instructions: "Public charities 
(but not churches) are allowed to carry on propaganda or otherwise 
influence legislation on a limited basis if they make the election 
provided by Section 23704.5." 61 
California's public trust doctrine first became a political issue 
when the attorney general's office cited it to justify its intervention 
in a dispute involving the Worldwide Church of God. On January 3, 1979, 
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a court-appointed receiver arrived without notice at headquarters in 
Pasadena and had public officials remove dozens of cartons of church 
records on the basis of an ex parte court order obtained hours earlier 
62 by the attorney general. Months later, the state legislature 
formalized the attorney general's power through a revision of the 
Nonprofit Religious Corporation Law. Almost immediately, a movement was 
begun by religious and political leaders to repeal this revision. State 
Sen. Nicholas Petris, a Democrat from Oakland, introduced legislation in 
1980, SB 1493, to repeal the new law. A major political battle took 
shape involving state legislators, civil liberties organizations, the 
press, and religious organization. Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., threw 
his support behind the bill and, after it passed, signed it into law at 
the end of September. Almost immediately, Attorney General George 
Deukmejian dropped legal action against the Worldwide Church of God, 
Synanon, and other religious groups accused of misusing tax-exempt 
income, claiming that effective date of the new law allowed him 
insufficient time to conclude the cases. This became a source of 
election year controversy. 63 
Meanwhile, more than sixty churches were attempting to sue the 
state over their lost exemptions. They were warned that they must pay 
back taxes or forfeit their property. Some of them received notices 
that their corporate rights were suspended. Blocked from seeking 
relief in the courts because they were stripped of their corporate 
identity, the churches sought a legislative solution. State Senator H. 
L. Richardson introduced a bill that that created an alternative 
"Religious Exemption" which simply required a one-time filing notice. A 
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week before Pastor Hans Nikoley's Pomerado Road Baptist Church of Poway 
was scheduled to be sold, Governor Deukmejian signed a bill cancelling 
the churches' liability for back taxes. 64 
Subsidies 
Even a brief survey of the numerous tax-related problems faced by 
churches suggests that a considerable degree of entanglement may be 
inherent in the very structure of the existing tax system. Although 
exemptions offer some limited protection against direct involvement with 
the government, they may eventuate in further entanglements if 
exemptions are made conditional. Furthermore, these problems would be 
unlikely to vanish if churches were taxed. Whether formally 
incorporated or not, churches operate within the context of a highly 
visible secular state that dominates all their horizons. The earlier 
institutional pluralism that allowed churches a considerable degree of 
independence from daily involvement with the state and its programs has 
given way to a growing institutional centralization within a highly 
integrated economic system. 
The entanglement hazards inherent in the tax system may also be 
inherent in the plethora of grant programs funded by the federal and 
state governments. Whether or not churches become formal recipients of 
aid, they may become unavoidably entangled in the conditions attached to 
such aid or be affected by an increasing scarcity of funding 
alternatives. Moreover, current patterns of giving tithes and offerings 
in the churches are substantially affected by the high level of public 
taxation and expenditure as well as by tax deductibility. 
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The fiscal relationship between church and state that has grown 
over the years is so comprehensive that the change of one factor, like 
the abolition of deductibility for church contributions, would have an 
enormous impact on church operations. A reduction of church property 
holdings could be expected as a result. The trend toward home churches 
and home Bible studies might be reinforced. But new developments never 
take place in a vacuum. Special precautions would still be required in 
order to safeguard religious liberty. Restrictive zoning regulations, 
stipulations on the use of public property, and other factors must be 
taken into account. 
The same motives that led originally to religious establishments 
may be at work in efforts to subsidize religious organizations. 
Churches were often entrusted with the responsibility of defending the 
moral and ideological standards of the community and reproducing the 
culture through education. The disestablishment of churches did nothing 
to change the demand for an institutionalized bulwark. It appears that 
churches continue to fill this function unofficially. Some financial 
ties with the state linger, although on an incidental basis. 65 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), was an early example of 
involvement by the federal judiciary in questions about aid to religion. 
If for no other reason, the Court's decision is significant for 
asserting the principle that religious bodies may form and operate 
1 t . 66 secu ar corpora lOns. Corporations are by definition creatures of the 
state, a fact that holds great significance for incorporated churches. 
While incidents such as the placement of the Worldwide Church of God 
into receivership and the loss of corporate privileges by a number of 
461 
California churches may be rare, they point up some of the political 
realities that currently define the relationship between church and 
state. 
Systematic federal aid was initiated--if tax exemptions are 
excepted--after the Second World War with passage of the Hill-Burton 
Act, which provided federal funds to assist the expansion of public and 
non-profit hospitals, which included denominational hospitals. Leo 
Pfeffer notes that opposition to such aid was less pronounced within 
Protestant and Jewish circles than it was toward aid to parochial 
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schools. Later, during the Kennedy Administration, the Peace Corps 
program fostered alliances between public and private agencies, half of 
h . h 1. . 68 w lC were re lglous. 
The year 1964, however, proved to be a watershed in the growing 
cooperation between church and state in the promotion of 
federally-funded programs. It was the year the Johnson Administration 
succeeded in pushing a comprehensive package of programs through 
Congress as part of its recently declared War on Poverty. Numerous new 
agencies, particularly the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and 
Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), were created to reach directly 
into local communities. Churches were mobilized in part of the effort. 
Observers were awed by the speed with which a national political 
consensus was reached and the direct cooperation of churches was 
enlisted. In many respects, the new mood resembled a religious revival 
and the President played the role of a Jonathan Edwards or a Charles 
Finney in orchestrating it. But emotional fervor was not the only 
element in the equation. As Lyle Schaller noted not long afterward, 
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another factor was the willingness of the federal government "to share 
the resources in its arsenal with its allies. There was money to be 
allocated, patronage to be dispensed, and dreams to be fulfilled. Many 
of the new allies quickly saw that here was an opportunity that would 
enable them to enlarge their own programs, accelerate their rate of 
progress, and strengthen their own institutional position." 69 Some 
churches shared in the resultant windfall but all churches were affected 
by the new political reality. Even as new interfaith alliances were 
forged, new frictions also developed as churches variously welcomed or 
resisted this warm political embrace. New centers of power emerged in 
local communities at a time when the political power structures in many 
states were being redefined through court-mandated reapportionment. 
The availability of grants-in-aid for sundry purposes--construction 
loans, student grants, aid to conduct poverty programs--brought the 
relationship of church and state to a new level of public awareness and 
political entanglement. It was the use of churches as channels of 
public programs and public money that evoked the greatest doubts. 
Subsidies that began as channels for promoting the general welfare 
became conduits also of government regulation. 
David Kucharsky observed in 1967 that six billion dollars a year in 
government subsidies was available to churches and other religious 
institutions. A variety of educational and social programs had been 
served this way since the Housing Act of 1950. The National Defense 
Education Act of 1958, the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, the 
Higher Education Act of 1965, and the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 were among the new instruments through which federal funds 
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were channeled into religious organizations. 70 These subsidies inspired 
. t• . t . t• t k . d" . l d" 71 separa lOnls · organlza lons o see JU lCla reme les. 
Indirect aid has also contributed to a tightening of controls. 
Surplus land sales, unrelated business income, lease backs, feeder 
corporations, and special low postage rates were among the loopholes and 
forms of assistance that separationists protested. Arthur Herzog 
summarized the state of affairs that existed in 1968: 
Sensibility for the feelings of organized religion seems to have 
dictated that "private" or "non-public" be used in government 
policy descriptions, but nonetheless, as of 1965, there were 115 
federal programs in which churches could participate. The Treasury 
gives confiscated wines and liquors to churches; the Office of 
Economic Opportunity's Project Headstart uses church buildings and 
pays for upkeep; under the recreation or urban renewal programs the 
churches can buy land with cheap loans; the National Institutes of 
Health awarded a large grant to Western Reserve University in 
Cleveland for internships for clergymen in urban ministries; even 
the Department of Agriculture was conducting a seminar called "The 
Christian Farmer and His Country" while rural churches were asked 
to observe "Soil Stewardship Week." "It is doubtful," writes Dr. 
LaNoue, "that there is a legislature in the land so tongue-tied 
that it could not find a multitude of secular7~urposes to cover any 
religious interest it wished to accommodate." 
Where these practices have not been abolished, they have been 
subjected to stricter regulations. Many persist, such as the disposal 
of surplus property at little or not cost to religious institutions. 
The Supreme Court upheld this practice on a five to four vote in in 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) 
when it held that Americans United lacked standing to sue. 
To date, complaints about entanglements have generally come from 
religious colleges. Hillsdale College in Michigan and Grove City 
College in Pennsylvania have both declined to participate in federal 
subsidy programs but have nevertheless been confronted with intrusive 
federal requirements because some of their students received federal 
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. t 73 assls ance. But another possible area of entanglement was opened up 
by the Court's ruling in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983), when 
it upheld a Minnesota tuition tax credit program. This decision may 
further encourage congressional efforts to provide tuition tax relief at 
a national level. 
Conclusions 
While the fear that the church may become too powerful is 
historically understandable, the present reality is that the 
jurisdictional authority of the church has been severely circumscribed. 
It commands no troops and controls no territory. Its primary defense is 
the power of public opinion, which is changeable. 
Part of the conflict over fiscal regulation of churches is clearly 
economic in motivation. Many churches pursue investment options, 
operate profitable business activities, acquire real estate holdings, 
accept large bequests, and receive tax breaks for parsonages, 
cemeteries, and other property not directly connected with the church 
sanctuary or exclusively used for worship. As with the mortmain laws of 
an earlier time, some states and municipalities restrict such 
acquisitions or refuse to exempt them from taxation. This may lead to 
difficulties for churches that must pay taxes until they complete their 
church building on newly acquired property. 
The fiscal crises of government at all levels is a primary 
motivating factor. Although the fiscal and monetary policies of the 
state may be faulted for creating the serious budgetary problems that 
have provoked some of these conflicts, the demand for solutions is not 
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any the less pressing. D. B. Robertson, who is critical of many 
exemptions enjoyed by churches, has clearly delineated the points of 
conflict: 
The increasing size of the public debt is a symptom of the presure 
upon, or within, the Federal Government for ever higher revenues. 
But even thoough increasing amounts of federal money are being 
"shared" with states and local governments, pressures continue to 
build on these levels for for more tax money. At the 1966 meeting 
of representatives of state legislatures, the following 
recommendation was offered as one requisite for improving the 
effectiveness of state legislatures: "Constitutional limits on the 
taxing power, constitutional ear-marking of funds, constitutional 
requirements that bond issues be submitted to popular vote, and 
other limitations on the legislature's power to appropriate public 
funds, and t94address itself to public questions, should be 
eliminated." 
It is an ironic testament to the deeprooted nature of the fiscal problem 
of the modern state that 1966 was at the peak of the postwar economic 
boom. The tendency toward compromise is endemic to contemporary 
politics, particularly when two or more competing goods are at stake. 
But Robertson noted the danger here: 
A spokesman for the citizens of New York State warned the delegates 
to the 1967 Constitutional Convention against removing the 
constitutional restraints that limit the real esate [sic] taxing 
powers of municipalities .. If these restraints are removed, he 
said, "the taxpayers will be at the mercy of local governmen75 that 
instinctively turn to real estate to solve fiscal problems." 
A major source of the problem with regard to taxes and exemptions, 
then, is not logic but ambition. Ambition is what prompts people to 
reach beyond the ambit of their authority, as James Madison understood 
when he proposed in Federalist No. 51: "Ambition must be made to counter 
ambition." 76 It is political ambition that lies at the base of what R. 
J. Rushdoony calls "the modern priestly state." 77 The unitary 
conception of the indivisible sovereign state--or the sovereign 
people--easily lends itself to ffinbition, even the ambition to do 
78 good. 
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Like most taxes, the income tax is not primarily a tax on the yield 
or profit. Apart from the variety of loopholes that tend to channel 
investments and savings in highly structured ways, the basic tax itself 
might best be described as a transaction tax, like sales and inheritance 
taxes. The mere act of transferring or receiving a good or service does 
not itself constitute income and the exchange of one commodity for 
another of equal market value does not generate income. The real income 
or profit that may result from a particular transaction derives from its 
subsequent use as capital or from the "release of energy" it permits by 
freeing capital for productive uses. 79 
The point is this: the income tax is to an appreciable degree a tax 
on productive capital. As with so many regulatory devices, it often has 
the effect of narrowing economic opportunities and channeling them 
through public or officially approved agencies. 80 To a large extent, 
social and economic risks are shifted out of the marketplace and into 
the political system itself where they are ultimately borne collectively 
by the taxpayers. Life outside these regulated areas tends to become 
even more insecure. Small businesses and farms are particularly 
vulnerable to inflation and high interest rates. But the hazards to 
those inside these areas may be just as formidable if they raise costs 
and reduce productivity. The politicization of taxation, employment, 
commerce, and so many other areas of social life is one consequence as 
official programs and agencies provide new opportunities for making 
friends, rewarding allies, and subduing foes. As George J. Stigler has 
pointed out: " With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give 
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money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of 
industries. 1181 
The income tax, like other taxes on capital, is perhaps a better 
mirror of human psychology than a measure of productivity or profit. 82 
The most characteristic features of the tax are its exemptions, 
deductions, adjustments, and credits. These betray its regulatory 
purpose and effectively introduce an element of psychological 
game-playing into the relationship between the people and their 
governors. John W. Burgess's appraisal of the motive behind the 
Sixteenth Amendment sharply contrasts with that of Edwin Seligman: 
The professional politicians were tumbling over each other to find 
a popular issue. The redistribution of wealth by governmental 
power was the winning idea of the day . . . and they framed this 
Amendment to meet that idea. The masqueraded, indeed, under the 
high-sounding patriotic principle that the Government should be 
empowered to get adequate revenues in times of emergency. But they 
were understood as they expected to be and intended to be. They 
framed the crudest, most reckless bit of constitutional legislation 
known to our history. It simply made waste paper of the 
Constitution in respect to the relation of Government to8~he 
constitutional rights of the Individual to his property. 
An amorphous revenue-collecting and regulatory system evolved over 
the years that has probably more than fulfilled Burgess's expectations. 
Not only are its loopholes or incentives regulatory in purpose but, for 
middle and lower income classes, they are also often disincentive in 
effect. They could not be better calculated to diminish productive 
capital or better designed to control or subdue economic growth if such 
84 
were their purpose. Apart from information-gathering, redistribution, 
or social control, this channeling of economic growth appears to be 
their only possible utility. 
The churches themselves must bear a considerable share of the 
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burden if they cooperate with fiscal and monetary schemes that reflect 
the techniques and ethics of a gambling casino. The framers of the 
Constitution had the palace intrigues of the urban courts of Europe 
firmly in mind as they sought to provide constitutional safeguards 
against political corruption. But the centralization of the money 
supply--whether in the form of the regulation of markets or some other 
means--eventually brings every other area of social and economic life 
into step behind it. The church--of all institutions--has the least 
excuse to allow itself to become a dependent of the state. It is called 
to a higher loyalty than either its own security or the changing 
policies of the political regime. 
The constitutionality of any law or policy should be considered 
suspect if an exemption or exception is required in order to protect 
religious liberty. If liberty is only for those who wish it or claim 
it, there is little to prevent its use as a carrot or a stick. The 
founders were suspicious of "energetic government." Their intent was 
that the state be limited by more substantial restraints than its own 
lack of energy or ability. Paper guarantees offer little protection in 
a world of covenant breakers. It was this recognitioon that led the 
framers of the Constitution to devise safeguards in the form of checks 
and balances within the framework of an institutional separation of 
powers. As Thomas Jefferson suggested, men must be bound by the chains 
of the Constitution. 
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